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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JAMES GOOLD CUTLER LECTURE
I
By LINDSAY ROGERS
Delivered at the College oj William and Mary, February 8, 19#

The architectonic principle of government under the
American Republic is that constitutionality is placed
above every other earthly consideration. Amendment,
judicial decision and custom have interpreted and
changed the last will and testament of the Founding
F.a~hers, but we are still bound by its explicit proVlSlOns.

To an Englishman it is almost incredible that the
United States must embark on the disguised civil war
of a presidential election at a time when the war
against National Socialism may be at its most critical
stage. "Why don't you postpone the election?", says
the Englishman. You reply that the Constitution
requires the election to be held. "Why don't you
amend the Constitution, and have your election when
the war is won?", asks the Englishman. You answer
that the procedure is too tedious and cumbersome to
work effectively before the date of the election and
that anyway the amendment probably would not
carry. Its real purpose, opponents would charge, was
to continue in office the present President and Commander-in-chief, and that the avoidance of an election
in war time was only a pretense.
As the tide of governmental activity ebbs and flows
and as each decade, almost each year, brings problems
that suddenly seem acute, particular paragraphs of
the last will and testament of the Founding Fathers
{3}

wax and wane in their importance. Blood shed in
the War between the States wiped out the constitutional ambiguity over slavery. The inability of the
national government to levy income taxes without
apportioning them among the States missed being
catastrophic only because a constitutional amendment
came into effect not too long before the country entered
its first World War. Only recently have judicial
decisions done much (but not enough) in clearing up
the debris and waste which resulted from the immunity
of State instrumentalities from federal taxation and
the reciprocal relief of federal instrumentalities from
the impact of State taxation.
A decade ago there were grave doubts first, as to
whether the Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent
the States from protecting their working populations,
and, secondly, whether Congress was doomed to stand
by idly while the economic life of the country slowly
ebbed. In the first case those doubts were resolved,
so far as minimum wage legislation was concerned,
by the Supreme Court of the United States changing
its mind, or rather by one judge changing his mind.
As my friend, Thomas Reed Powell, put it: "A switch
in time saved nine". On the second point the doubts
were resolved not only by a change of mind but by
a change in the Court.
Happily the provisions of the last will and testament
of the Founding Fathers have never been unduly
limiting in respect of the exercise of the war power.
Constitutional pedants have sometimes viewed with
alarm and there were grave discussions concerning
unconstitutionality during the War between the States.
But in 1861 and 1917 national power was not hamstrung, and in this conflict, whatever weakness and
indecision may be charged to its conduct have come
from human frailties and are not compelled by any
language of the Founding Fathers. The exchange
of destroyers for naval and air bases, Lend-Lease,
priorities, price controls, rationing-there is a plentitude of power and its use can be prompt.
{4}

In respect of the manner in which we conduct our
foreign relations, however, the situation is vastly
different. The formulation and execution of policies
which seek to preserve and organize peace, and which
if unsuccessful require, in Clausewitz' phrase, "another
means" to carry them out, are under a dark shadow
cast by the testamentary provisions of the Founding
Fathers. If they remain there the United States,
after emerging victorious from a second World War,
will again be defeated by the peace. That it is not
only unwise but unnecessary for our foreign relations
to be hampered by the Constitution is the thesis I
offer you today.
I.
When, after the first World War ended a quarter of
a century ago, we had difficulties in making peace,
our constitutional arrangements for the control of
foreign affairs were vehemently discussed and their
wisdom seriously questioned. N ow, while the second
W orld War is still in progress, they are again being
discussed and only a tiny minority in the country
dares to deny a change would be desirable. As I shall
argue with you, change is possible by custom. Indeed,
some change has already come about. But I shall
also argue, in Edmund Burke's phrase, that the laws
reach but a little way. "Constitute government how
you please," Burke declared, "infinitely more will
depend on the wisdom and discretion of those who
have it in charge." Political courage, political morality,
accommodations between the executive and the legislature within the wide ambit which the constitutional
texts allow for rashness and discretion-these matters
may prove as fateful to the future welfare of the
country as the constitutional requirement that the
President "shall have the power by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur".
Political intelligence and courage in high places is
something we can only hope for and seek to deserve.
{5}

But the constitutional provision that one more than
one-third of the Senate can veto treaties, that, as John
Hay put it, "for all time the kickers should rule", is a
matter we can do something about.
And we must do it if we are not to lose the peace.
Happily there seems to be an increasing awareness of
this truth. During recent weeks there has beell a
good deal of discussion of the behavior of the Senate
when it was dealing with the Treaty of Versailles. A
distinguished Senator warns against "another kiss of
death" and maintains that the osculatory preparations
are already under way. This is not the place to rehash
old controversies. It is sufficient to say that in 19191920 all the fault was not on one side. Proper compromises by President Wilson would have taken the
United States into the League of Nations and launched
a foreign policy that might have been tolerable in
respect of the problems of the post-war world. Whether
the succeeding Republican administration, which was
so shy of the League of Nations that it refused to
acknowledge communications from the Secretary-General, would have cooled on that policy and abandoned
it speedily can only be a matter of conjecture.
The plain fact is-and no one can deny it-that,
in Mr. Wilson's phrase, used in 1917 when the Senate
was considering legislation, "a little group of wilful
men"-that is, Senators-can make the great Government of the United States helpless and contemptible.
In 1917 the little group did it by filibustering against
the Armed Ship Bill. One more than one-third of the
Senate can do it in respect of any treaty, and there
are few save Senators who would raise their voices to
say that such an arrangement is tolerable. To friendly
foreign governments with which we negotiate, the
arrangement seems intolerable. An English writer
uses the sport of kings to illustrate the American
position. "The President of the United States", he
says, "is in the position of a trainer who (to the distress
of the Jockey Club) is allowed to enter his horse
'America' for the classic races. But only the owner
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· 'We the people of the United States' has the power
to put up the stake money without which, in this drab
world, entries are not finally accepted. For example,
every American President since Wilson's time has
entered 'America' for the World Court. And each
time the owners, represented by their chosen trustees,
the Senate, have cancelled the entry. There is no
evidence that the owners have become more ready to
put up the stake money than they were in 1920 or
anytime down to 1939."1

II.
The history of the treaty provision in the Philadelphia Convention has been dealt with in many authoritative volumes. I have myself dealt with it in a book
which was rather called "provocative" 2. But here it
is worth while to make a brief reference to that history.
As is well known, the framers were all nervous of
unrestrained authority, whether it was possessed by
an executive or a legislature. With the exception of a
small minority, in which Alexander Hamilton was
most conspicuous, the men in the Philadelphia Convention desired to get away from a strong government
and by checks and balances to a void tyranny by any
branch of the political establishment or even by a
majority of the people acting through their elected
representatives. That system of checks pervades the
whole constitution and is carried so far that practically
but one power is conferred without a corresponding
restraint on its exercise. This is the power of executive
clemency and for misusing it, the President would be
accountable to the Senate in an impeachment proceeding.
One of the early drafts of the Constitution provided
that "the Senate of the United States shall have the
power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors
and judges of the Supreme Court". This was objected
1 D. W. Brogan:
"British and American Foreign Policy", Nineteenth
Century, January 1943.
2 "The American Senate" (1926).
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to by Madison on the ground "that the Senate rep- .
resented the States alone and that for this, as well as
other obvious reasons, it was proper that the Preside+it
should be an agent in treaties". There were, however,
certain causes which operated to incline the Convention
to favor dual control of foreign relations. Hamilton
apart, the framers desired to get away from the English
precedent of treaty negotiation by ministers and ratification by the Crown. They feared possible autocracy
in case the function was given to one man. It was
suggested that since other clauses in the Constitution
prohibited the States from making individual treaties
they should be compensated for this loss through power
being given. to the representatives of the States in the
upper house; they would thus be safeguarded against
injury by federal treaty action. Finally, under the
Articles of Confederation, the power of entering into
treaties and alliances had been v~sted in "the United
States in Congress assembled" and nine- that is, twothirds-of the thirteen States voting as units in Congress had to assent to any commitments. Congress
had been so determined to keep foreign matters in its
own hands that when a Foreign Secretary was appointed in 1782 he was instructed by a resolution to
submit to Congress for its inspection and approval all
letters to Ministers of Foreign Affairs relating to
treaties and the plans of treaties themselves. That
this was clumsy machinery could not be denied, but
clumsy machinery the weaknesses of which are known
-in 1782 or a century and a half later- sometimes
seems more desirable than a nicely balanced machinery ·
that may run too rapidly. In any event some arrangement midway between that of the Crown and that of
the Thirteen Colonies seemed to be indicated.
A fortnight before the Convention adjourned a new
draft of the treaty-making clause joined the President
with the Senate. To the proposal that ratification by
the House of Representatives should be necessary also
it was answered that general legislative approval would
frustrate the desire for secrecy. If it were to be the
i8}-

Senate alone, there should be a two-thirds vote. Hence,
when the Committee on Style reported only three
days before the adjournment of the Convention, the
language of the constitutional provision which we now
have appeared for the first time. The clause was the
result of a compromise. Had the Convention remained
in session longer there might have been a change.
But the more prolonged the session the more the ,
opportunity for criticism in the country. Moreover,
the weather in Philadelphia was quite warm. The
delegates were exhausted. They wished to conclude
their labors quickly. Not independent of accidental
causes, therefore, was the emergence of the provision
now in the Constitution. Thus the tergiversations in
the Convention sh'ould serve to remind us that there
is nothing particularly sacred about this clause of the
Constitution. It is a child of chance rather than of
logic or experience.
The difficulty now is that the advice and consent
of the Senate are looked upon not as a check but as
inviting the substitution of senatorial judgment for
executive judgment. The Senate can and does dictate
to the President. "One more than one-third of our
number", its ultimatum reads, "will defeat the treaty
in its present form but we will approve the treaty if
changes are made in certain particulars which we
specify. Our judgment is better than yours. Public
opinion will not be able to touch us until it has forgotten
or is distracted by other issues. We care nothing about
delays or embarrassments vis-a.-vis other nations, so
you had better agree to accept the only conditions on
which our minority will not exercise its constitutional
veto."
A legislative chamber may of course present a similar
ultimatum on pending bills but it is proper that
statutes should emerge from the conflict and reconciliation of different views, and that minorities should
receive some concessions. Mutilation of a bill is
rarely so important or so final as mutilation of a treaty,
and there is no foreign contracting party to consider.
{9}
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Furthermore, on legislation there is no constitutionally
protected veto by one more than one-third. Perhaps
it is not true, as John Hay maintained, that "there
will always be 34 per cent. of the Senate on the blackguard side of every question that comes before them".
But there will always be Senators who insist on their
individual prejudices or who espouse sectional or racial
interests. Not a few Senators are profoundly convinced that their wisdom is greater than that of the
Executive. Senator Borah, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, proclaimed to the
country that through his own sources of information
which he thought were better than the sources available to the Executive, he had been assured that there
would be no European war. Moreover, with the
backscratching and capricious accommodation which
flourish in every assembly not subject to responsible
party leadership, it is easy to create a minority larger
than 34 per cent. and to propose the substitutiop.
of its program for the program submitted by the
Executive.
"There are only two things wrong with Henry Cabot
Lodge", wrote Henry Adams. "One is that he is a
Senator. The second is that he is a Senator from
Massachusetts." This is a political imponderable
which cannot be weighed but only pondered. There
are ninety-six Senators. The amour propre attaching
to membership in that august body seems considerably
greater-certainly its manifestations are more obvious
and objectionable-than the amour propre attaching
to membership in a chamber composed of 435. It
would probably be incorrect to argue that a larger
percentage of Senators than of Representatives hold
queer opinions or are demagogues or crackpots. But
because there is unlimited debate in the Senate, because
the newspapers think that the views of one of ninetysix are more important than the views of one of four
hundred and thirty-five, the country becomes much
more aware of the mental eccentricities of certain
Senators than of the eccentricities of their counter-{lOJ.

parts in the House of Representatives. In Great
Britain rules of procedure in the House of Commons,
the relative unimportance of the private, dissident
member, and the shortage of newsprint combine to
make demagogues blush unseen. Who will deny that
this is an advantage?
Psychologically also the constitutional provision Ithat
action may be prevented by one more than one-third
of a body is an invitation to individuals to make up a
large enough minority to interpose their veto. How,
save on grounds such as these, is it possible to explain
the refusal of the Senate to consider the protocol establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice
when the House of Representatives was voting overwhelmingly-303 to 28-in favor of adherence and
asserting its readiness "to participate in the enactment
of such legislation as will necessarily follow such
approval"? Even if the majority be viewed as somewhat swollen because the House had no direct responsibility and was taking a hortatory rather than a
decisive action, it surely represented a willingness in
the country for the Senate to act favorably. Yet for
ten years after that vote in the House the Senate
refused to act and when the test finally came, more
than the one-third minority was in being.
How account for the fact that the Fulbright resolution passed the House of Representatives by 360 to 29;
that the Senate hemmed and hawed for six months;
and that only the tremendous popular acclaim which
was given the Moscow Agreement sufficed to rouse
the upper chamber from its lethargy, or, more accuagonism and finical
rately, to make it abandon its antO
concern with its own constitutional prerogatives? That
a resolution which admitted that the country is part
of the world was finally passed is encouraging, but
I find myself unable to agree with those who think
that this is a cause for rejoicing. The resolution is in
such broad terms that one could vote for it and then
could find good and sufficient reasons to oppose any
specific scheme for implementation. If, after months
~
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of consideration, the impact of an unexpected world
event was necessary to force the Senate to give approval
to a measure which is in such vague terms as to be
almost platitudinous, how can one be sanguine of
Senate behavior when the question is that of cleaning
up the mess that this war will leave in its wake? During
the debate on the Treaty of Versailles, Senator John
Sharp Williams said that the Senate would not vote
approval of the Ten Commandments or the Lord's
Prayer without insisting on reservations. I suppose
that if the Senate recited "Now I lay me down to
sleep", someone would insist on adding "and other
appropriate forms of repose".

III.
How far the framers intended the Senate to be a
privy council charged with foreign affairs is not clear.
Certainly they thought that the Senate-then quite a
small body-would consult with the President frequently. Washington did consult but his experience
was such that future collaboration was not attempted.
The accident of an early incident determined the
development of a constitutional practice which has
been just as important as constitutional language.
In his memoirs John Quincy Adams gives a muchquoted account of President Washington's having
gone to the Senate with a project of a treaty, and of
having been present while the Senators deliberated
upon it. "They debated it", wrote Adams, "and proposed alterations so that when Washington left the
Senate Chamber he said he would be damned if he
ever went there again", and ever since that time treaties
have been negotiated by the Executive without submitting them to the consideration of the Senate. Only
on rare occasions since have there been consultations.
In 1830 Jackson asked the Senate for its advice on a
proposed Indian Treaty, "fully aware that in thus
resorting to the early practice of this government by
asking the previous advice of the Senate in the dis-

t
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charge of this portion of my duties I am departing
from a long and for many years unbroken usage in
similar cases". Sixteen years later President Polk,
in his message on the Oregon Boundary settlement,
said that "this practice, though rarely resorted to in
latter times was, in my judgment, eminently wise and
may, on occasions of great importance, be properly
revived". If the President is wise, as Lord Bryce
remarked, "he feels the pulse of tlie Senate which, like
other assemblies, has a collective self-esteem". But
the growing size of the Senate made it inevitable that
formal consultation would be rare. The rules still
provide for executive sessions with the President, but
in 1906 Senator Lodge said that if a request of that
sort were made by the President it would be resented.
Until the debate on the Treaty of Versailles, however, the Senate held executive sessions when it considered relations with foreign powers. In 1919, there
was unlimited debate on the peace treaties and the
Covenant. The Senate was a legislative chamber,
amending and reserving. It is not desired "at this
particular moment to afford opportunity for intemperate and trouble-making debate on the floor of the
Senate. It is known to all well-informed men that the
utmost freedom of debate is permitted under the
Senate rules. It is further known that Senators do
not hesitate to avail themselves of that unlimited
freedom. International relations are delicate and
sensitive. Unity and harmony require consultation
and co-operation". ' Thus Senator Connally when, for
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he explained the reasons for not reporting the Fulbright
Resolution. l
Secretaries of State consult with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations but not as much as they
should. The ease with which in 1913 Secretary of
State Bryan's conciliation treaties were accepted was
due to the fact that the then Great Commoner had
discussed them with the Senate Committee. Recently
1

New York Times, September 25, 1943.

t
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there have been promising contracts between certain
Senators and the State Department for the consideration of post-war policies, but a good deal more could
be done. The British House of Commons, which is
not organized in committees, does have an informal
group of members who are specially interested in
international questions. The Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs occa~ionally appears before this group
and discusses matters with them more frankly than
he could in the House. The advice and criticism he
may get are helpful, and members of the group, made
more au courant with developing policies, are likely
to be better informed and more sympathetic supporters
of the Secretary of State when matters become before
the House for discussion. Secretary Hull's appearance
before Congress to report on the Moscow agreements
was all to the good even though, unlike Mr. Eden in
the House of Commons, Mr. Hull simply made a
pronouncement and did not participate in any debate.
The more the State Department abandons its aloofness
from Congress and its members the more likely a
sympathetic understanding of its policies 2

IV.
The one more than one-third of the Senate could be
made up of Senators from the seventeen smallest States
which contain not more than one-twelfth of the people
of the country. It may be said that such a calculation
is fanciful, and it probaply is. But the elected representatives of the people of the United States number
531, and I submit that there is no reason in allowing
33-less than 7 per cent. of them-to determine the
foreign policy of the United States. It should in
2 See the correspondence between Secretary Hull and Senator Wiley over
the latter's proposal to set up a Foreign Relations Advisory Council composed
of high officials of the State Department and of representatives of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs. Congressional Record, November 25, 1942.

-{14 }-

frankness be added that the 7 per cent "might protect"
the more populous States of the country nine of which
contain a majority of the population. The Senators
from these nine States plus sixteen other Senators
could defeat a combination of the thirty-one smallest
States. But such alignments have never taken place
and it is inconceivable that they oould in the field of
foreign policy. Section versus section (New York
and Delaware; California and Nevada); farmer versus
labor; wealth versus poverty-alignments could and
will be on these lines but happily not on bigness versus
smallness. Happily also our racial stocks are not
thus distributed over the country. Nor is the argument against the two-thirds rule affected by the fact
that 24 States with 23 millions would have the same
voting power as 24 States with 108 millions population.
Who is alarmed by that in respect of legislation?
It should be . remembered that, when the present
constitutional arrangement was accepted, the conduct
of foreign relations was much more the peculiar
province of kings than it now is. This is not the
place to argu~ whether, as diplomacy has become
democratized, it has become more successful, or to
consider the merit or the demerit of the second part
of the first of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points: "open
covenants of peace, openly arrived at". The first
part is unchallenged.
No non-totalitarian government today, with responsible political leaders, would
propose that that government accept international
commitments without the nature of the commitments
being known in advance, discussed by the public and
approved by .elected representatives of the peopletacitly, as is the case with the British Parliament, or
explicitly in other countries by some legislative ratifying authority. If, as Walter Bagehot said seventy-five
years ago, legislation of exceedingly minor importance
is debated clause by clause and must run the gamut of
parliamentary approval" there is no reason why a
{ 15
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treaty which may commit the lives and fortunes of
millions of citizens should not run a similar gamut of
criticism and be submitted for approval by a representative assembly.
Indeed, it may be argued that our present machinery
for advising and consenting to the ratification of
treaties is obsolete and undemocratic not only because
a minority of the Senate can interpose a veto but
because two-thirds of the Senate are not sufficiently
representative to put the kind of imprimatur of
approval that there should be on an international
engagement. A foreign policy would have much more
moral backing if, as a policy, it had to be supported
by the House of Representatives as well as by the
Senate in order to be binding. Such support must
come later when the House passes appropriations or
implementing legislation. In effect, then, the House
has a veto which it does not exercise.
In so far as the content of foreign policy is concerned, the House of Representatives has a greater
interest than it had when international questions were
predominantly politicaL Domestic problems and international relations are far more closely intertwined
than they used to be. A Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act
sets up a series of tariff retaliations in Europe which
lead to economic misery-the well-watered soil in
which the seeds of dictatorship blossom and burgeon
rapidly. A policy of reflation-as was Mr. Roosevelt's
policy in 1933-torpedoes the World Economic Conference in London and has far-reaching international
complications. The question of whether we retain in
operation the synthetic rubber plants which have
been built in this war will determine the prosperity or
the penury of native populations in the Pacific Islands
and in -South American states. Foreign offices, even
though reluctantly, have come to recognize that the
emissaries that they send abroad must be more than
diplomats: they must know something of business
and economic organization. They must not be permitted to become aloof from currents of opinion
{ 16}

and from emerging domestic problems in their own
countries. Hence both the British Foreign Office
and the State Department are paying attention to
the problem of recruiting men for the foreign service
whose training will cover much more than diplomatic
history, diplomatic forms, international law-in short,
what one of the writers on diplomacy called the art of
negotiation with princes. Pending the recruitment of
such a type of public servant, every Embassy now
has economic experts, commercial counsellors, labor
advisers, press and radio officers whose jobs are more
important than the jobs of the military, naval and
air attaches.
When war came foreign offices and embassies were
not so staffed. Hence a plethora of special agencies
which performed special tasks in respect of international relations: economic warfare and foreign propaganda. In the United States there was quarrelling
over who was to do what. Economic warfare was at
first a kind of step-child of the army and then under a
Board headed by Vice-President Wallace. A violent
quarrel with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
which was itself waging economic battles for raw materials, resulted in all such activities, theoretically at
least, going under the control of the State Department.
But then in September last this new organization, the
competing show which the State Department had been
running, and Lend-Lease, which had been and still
was separate, were thrown together into a Foreign
Economic Administration not formally under the Secretary of State but with great powers that must be
"exercised in conformity with the foreign policy of
the United States as defined by the Secretary of
State". Meanwhile, the internal fermentation in the
State Department had been incessant. A mere enumeration of the many shifts, which I list in an appendix,
will show vividly how the task of diplomacy has been
transformed. Once diplomats had to court monarchs
and curry favor with royal mistresses. Then it was
important that they interpret the views of and get
-{ 17 }

along well with "the governing classes"l. Their popularity with the peoples of the governments to which
they are accredited must now be taken into account.
But above all, ambassadors must now administer
swollen chancelleries and large staffs of their own.
They must also keep in touch with and seek to coordinate the activities of a host of officials from different
national departments or agencies-commerce, agriculture, labor, information, propaganda-who are seeking to carry out what is the supposed foreign policy of
their country. Great Britain has attempted an ad hoc
solution of the problem in the Middle East and Washington by appointing emissaries of cabinet rank. When
this war began foreign offices thought their cavalry
was still all important. The bombers and the tanks
were manufactured in other branches of the government. Now foreign offices properly seek to take over
the direction of the new arms.
In short, modern diplomacy is the business of the
executive and the representatives of the people in a
sense that it has never been before. Under American
constitutional law, as I have said, treaties are not selfexecuting but always require legislation to implement
them. Money must be provided and that can be
forthcoming only by an appropriation approved by
Congress. The size of the army and navy and air
force and the wealth or penury of those forces in
weapons are determined by Congress. Why, then,
should it be thought that an international engagement
from which important domestic and fiscal consequences
will flow has enough general backing if it is approved
only by two-thirds of the Senators of the United States?
Why should the liquidation of lend-lease, arrange1 Since the war began Atticus, a well-known Englishman who contributes a
column to the London Sunday Times, wrote as follows concerning the appointment of a new British Ambassador to Brazil. It was, he said, "swift promotion for a man who, three years ago, was counsellor at our Embassy in
Rome. Sir - - - , who will be fifty this year, played golf with Ciano, was
faultlessly correct with the Germans, and did his best to keep Mussolini sane.
With his excellent wardrobe, his epicurean taste as a host, his good-humoured
imperturbability, and his attractive wife, he will make friends quickly in
Rio de Janeiro".
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ments for currency stabilization, the provision of international development funds, the disposition of excess
merchant shipping, and agreement on air routes be
subject to veto by one more than one-third of the
Senate, or approved without the consent of the House
of Representatives? If Congress must declare war,
why should the treaty-making machinery be allowed
to make peace? These questions have become familiar
ones and there is now a growing body of opinion which
is eager to put the two-thirds vote on the shelf and
to see international engagements approved by a majority vote in both branches of Congress precisely like
domestic legislation.
This, of course, would strengthen the position of the
President. He would have a much easier time getting
a majority of Congress to follow the course which he
had charted on what he conceived to be the interests
of the country than he has had in the past or than he
would have in the future of getting two-thirds of the
Senate. But though he would have an easier time he
would have a great many difficulties.
Opinion in the House of Representatives is just as
accurate a reflection of opinion in the country as a
whole as is the opinion of the Senate. Indeed there
are sound reasons for assuming that the House is a
better mirror-that it may sometimes be too good a
mirror when, in yielding to pressure groups, Representatives think more of re-election at the end of their
two-year term than they do of serving the interests of
their country. It is then that the House becomes too
much like a Congress of Ambassadors which does not
deliberate and agree but follows instructions. Senators, _
secure for a six-year term, can afford to be more
independent of such pressures. They can also be much
more individualistic.
Because of the shorter term, because of the size of
the body, because no publicist has ever thought it
pertinent to say of a Representative, "I have two
faults to find with him: he is a Representative and he
is a Representative from a particular state", the House
{ 19 }-

of Representatives would be a more cooperative partner
in the conduct of foreign relations that the Senate has
proved to be. But even when the President deals
with Congress as a whole, he still has difficulties. He
is unable to crack the whip of party discipline. Mr.
Chamberlain, to be sure, cracked that whip too effectively when he threw Mr. Eden overboard from his
Cabinet and when he flew to Munich. 1 But few in the
United States would deny that presidential inability to
use the whip at all handicaps him severely in all his
dealings with Congress and permits his leadership in
foreign policy to be flouted with impunity. There is in
the United States an institutional encouragement of
legislative antagonism to the President instead of institutional encouragement to cooperation. Sectional or
racial pressure which in England is effectively channelled through the conduit of recognized executive
leadership and effective party control would continue
to intimidate our solons-and also our executive. But
President versus Congress on foreign policy would
present issues to the country. One-third of the Senate
versus the President clouds issues.
Difficulties have arisen from the fact that, during
recent years those responsible for the initial formulation of our foreign policy and for explaining that formulation to the legislature and to the public have
seemed to be confused in the,ir own minds and have
spoken "\\'ith divided voices. 2 They may reply, to be
sure, that they fear to be too explicit because they
thereby invite congressional criticism and antagonism.
That explains but does not excuse their conduct. For
example (Time, January 30) Secretary Hull rather
1 I never use this word without recalling some magnificent lines in Frank
Sullivan's Christmas greetings in the New Yorker (December 1939):
"To every moral eunuch
Who had a hand in the Pact of Munich,
The rhyme is bad but the Pact was worse
What was Neville's plane will be Europe's hearse."
2 Some years ago a group of British Liberals, in a statement of policies
they would like to see pursued-a statement which was remarkable because
it was agreed to rather than because of its substance-referred to the difficulties arising "from the fact that, owing to the American Constitution and
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vehemently denied that there had been any reticence

in respect of what the State Department knew about
the intentions of Hitler and particularly of the Japanese
war lords. Those intentions, he said, were all spelled out
in the report which the State Department issued some
months ago called "War and Peace". The i's were
dotted and the t's crossed in the supporting volume of
documents which was published later.
True it is that those who paid some attention to the
sweep of affairs, who had had some experience in interpreting newspaper dispatches and the urbane understatements of diplomats, "will be forced to view with
alarm, etc., etc.", knew that the Far Eastern situation
The plain fact, however, is
was steadily worsening.
that no one in a high place ever told Congress or the
American people in plain. terms what Ambassador
Grew is now effectively telling the people he had
reported to the State Department and what the
"War and Peace" volume shows that the State Department knew long before Pearl Harbor. There was no
real reporting to Congress or to the nation.
The Department of State is the only one of the
executive departments which does not send an annual
report to Congress. If as Chief of Staff General
Marshall can present to Congress a statesmanlike
document which deals rather frankly with strategy,
materiel, I see no reason why the Department of State
could not present a comparable report. What education of the country there is derives from speeches or
press conferences, and here the voices are not infrequently discordant. The counsellors are multitudinous and the people cannot detect which wisdom it is
American traditions, the foreign policy of the United States is less predictable
than that of other countries. In America, the agreements which the State
Department negotiates with other countries have to be based to an exceptional
degree upon principles firmly rooted in American public opinion; and other
counties must recognize that the arrangements that they may make with
the United States cannot be relied upon to stand in face of a substantial
change in American public opinion. Thus the predictability of American
foreign policy has perforce to be based not wholly, or even mainly, upon
binding treaty engagements, but rather upon the enunciation, and the evident
acceptance by public opinion, of certain cardinal principles of policy." The
Next Five YeaTS (1935), pp. 239-240.
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that they should make their own. There was truth as
well as cynicism in the remark that Lord Melbourne is
supposed to have made after a Cabinet meeting: "Did
we act in order to raise the price of corn, or to lower it?
It does not matter what we say so long as we all say
the same thing." There are other considerations, some
minor, some major. Save when Mr. Bryan was Secretary of State, there has not been much attempt to
work with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Moreover, the State Department lives in a dark
shadow oast by lawyers. Save, I think, in one or two
cases, the Secretaries have always been of the profession which, in Burke's phrase, may quicken the
intellect but which, save in those happily born, will
not invigorate the understanding. Elihu Root and
Mr. Hull have been exceptions. They can keep themselves from thinking like lawyers.

v.
To remove the difficulties which I have been considering would not require constitutional change. They
are matters of administrative habits and political
custom and there is no reason why in respect of them
there could not be substantial and early improvement.
But the constitutional difficulty would still remain.
Proposals have recently been made in many quarters
for a constitutional amendment which would assimilate
treaties to ordinary legislation and make it impossible
for the kickers-that is, for one more than on~-third of
the Senate-to have the final say. Such a proposal
seems to me quite impractical. Save as the result of
an unmistakable and long-continued insistence by the
country, the Senate could not be expected to join in the
submission of such a constitutional amendment to the
states for ratification. It is improbable, almost impossible, that a constitutional amendment could be
ratified in time to permit the Congress rather than the
Senate to approve the post-war settlements. Agitation
over such an amendment would be dangerous. Ratifi{22 }

cation by three-quarters of the Conventions in the
states or by three-quarters of the legislatures might be
possible but it would be opposed by the anti-British,
anti-Russian elements, by narrow nationalists who
would feel that they would have less hope of getting
their views to prevail through a congressional majority
than they now have through one more than one-third
of the Senate. They would cry, "God save the fair
fabric of our constitution from mutilation" when what
they really meant was that they wished to retain a
constitutional arrangement which would permit them,
a minority, to have their way. Their intellectually
dishonest opposition would get support from the inertia
which works against any institutional change. Meanwhile the Senate would accept the implicit invitation
to insist on the full use of all its prerogatives until by
the amending authority those special prerogatives had
been taken away.
Hence it seems to me that the sensible-indeed the
only practicable- procedure is to put the treatymaking authority on the shelf and for the President to
enter into international undertakings through executive agreements discussed in advance, so far as is
possible, with the House and Senate committees and
ratified by joint resolutions of Congress. For this
there are many precedents, which have been much
discussed. 1
If, after the Senate, because of the two-thirds rule,
refused to advise and consent to the ratification of
proposed treaties, Congress could by joint resolutions
admit Texas to the Union, annex Hawaii and conclude
peace with Germany, what subject of international
agreement can be conceived inappropriate for Presidential-Congressional approval? The transfer of fifty
destroyers for leases of British bases near the United
States was negotiated by the President and legislative
approval came when Congress appropriated for the
construction of installations in the islands. We have
1 Wallace McClure:
International Executive Agreements. Democratic Procedure under the C0n8titution of the United States (1941).
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in effect a continuing defensive alliance with Great
Britain which is not in the form of a treaty but which
for that reason is no less binding. The President sent
the Lend-Lease Bill to Congress and its enactment
into law gave the Executive authority to negotiate
mutual aid agreements which are binding without
Senatorial approval. The agreements setting up the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration were drafted in consultation with certain members of the Senate and the House, were deliberately
withdrawn from the treaty-making authority, and
were approved by Congress. The country and Congress realized that they were necessary. Why let a
few Senators who spoke only for themselves each cast
two votes against the agreements? Who indeed would
say that anyone of the measures I have enumerated
- could have been put in the form of a treaty without
causing a long and painful fight in the Senate with
perhaps mutilation the price that would have to be
paid to buy off the one more than one-third.
The complete abandonment of treaty-making in the
technical sense would not be anti-democratic, anticonstitutional, or even extra-constitutional. Of course
it will be said that putting the treaty provisions on the
whelf would do violence to the literary theory of the
. Constitution. But constitutional and political morality
are more important than literary theory. What constitutional morality really means was well expressed
by the historian Grote when he was discussing the
working of Athenian democracy in the time of
Kleisthenes. It meant "the perfect confidence in the
bosom of every citizen amidst the bitterness of party
contest that the spirit of the constitution will be no
less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own" .
Quadrennially, we witness in the United States a
perfect expression of such constitutional morality:
when we elect a President. Anyone who worries about
the literary theory of the Constitution and who challenges the approval of internat~onal agreements by a
majority of Congress rather than by two-thirds of the
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Senate should go on to argue that the 1944 Electoral
College should disregard the popular vote and exercise
a free choice of the President of the United States.
There was no constitutional amendment imposing on
the Electoral College the requirement that it be a
rubber-stamp. Even though the framers intended the
Electoral College to be an efficient mechanism and to
avoid the choice of the President by popular vote,
agreement and custom, now long unchallengeable, have
worked the change. We could deal in the same way
with the treaty-making authority.
As is so frequently the case in problems of government-in what the late Mr. F. S. Oliver called "The
Endless Adventure" -forms are less important than
spirit and substance. This was well put by de Tocqueville when he addressed the French Chamber just
before the overthrow of Louis Phillippe:
"It is not the mechanism of the laws," he
declared, "that produces great events but the
inner spirit of government. Keep the laws as
they are if you wish. I think you would be
wrong to do so; but keep them. Keep the
men too if it gives you any pleasure . . . but
in God's name change the spirit of your government for, I repeat, that spirit will lead you
directly to the abyss."
NOTE.-Other undertakings and absence from the country have delayed
me in preparing this lecture for publication. Although, in the meantime,
much water has flowed under the bridge which was my text, I have resisted
the temptation to make an extensive revision, and the words which have
been read (or not read) are substantially those that were spoken on February
8th. Since then two books have appeared which support the position I
took: Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and World Organization, and
Kenneth Colegrove, The American Senate and World Peace.
I should add, however, that the 1944 Republican Platform, after favoring
"responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative
organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and
to attain permanent peace", declares that:
" . . . any treatment or agreement to attain such aims . . .
shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'
of the United States, provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur."
If this pledge should receive more honour than planks in party platforms
usually receive, the country might just as well make up its mind that the
continuation of policy by means other than war will not be successful.
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APPENDIX
Most observers of the Washington scene have had
the impression that the administrative organization to
deal with international economic operations and problems has not been clear cut and unconfused. When
the detailed schedule of starts and halts, of trials and
errors, of reorganization and streamlining is examined,
the wonder grows that the confusion has not been
much worse.
In its issue for 5 February 1944 the Department of
State Bulletin reviewed the earlier development of
organizations to deal with economic operations--a
chronology which came down to the end of 1943, when
the Department reorganized itself and established
twelve major "line" offices. Two of the new officesthe Office of Wartime Economic Affairs and the Office
of Economic Affairs-"were created to initiate and
coordinate policy and action, so far as the Department
of State is concerned, in all matters pertaining to the
economic relations of the United States with other
governments" .
During the previous four and one-half years there
had been many committees, commissions, corporations, bureaux and offices. The Foreign Agricultural
Service and the Foreign Commerce Service had been
transferred to the Department of State on 1 July 1939.
On 3 October of that year an Inter-American Financial
and Economic Advisory Committee had been set up.
Two months later there came into being an Interdepartmental Committee for the Coordination of Foreign
and Domestic Military Purchases. On 26 February
1940 the Department of State established a Division
of Commercial Affairs. In May the Office for Emergency
Management was created. June saw the birth of an
Inter-American Development Commission, Rubber Reserve Company, Metals Reserve Company and Division
of Commercial Treaties and Agreements. In July an
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Office of the Administrator of Export Control was
established. Fourteen months later its responsibilities and duties were transferred to the Economic Defense Board. In August 1940 the Council of National
Defense, with the approval of the President, created an
Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, and the President and the Canadian Prime Minister set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States and
Canada, "to consider in the broad sense the defense
of the north half of the Western Hemisphere".
There was a lull until January 1941. There then came
into being the Office of Production Management; Feb- ·
ruary saw the setting-up of a Committee for Coordination of Inter-American Shipping; in March Congress
passed the Lend-Lease Act; and in Mayan Executive
Order established the Division of Defense Aid Reports in
the Office for Emergency Management to provide "a
channel for clearance of transactions and reports and
to coordinate the processing of requests for aid under
the Lend-Lease Act". Six months later this Division of
Defense Aid Reports was abolished and its functions
were taken over by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. Meanwhile, during these six months the United
States and Canada established a Material Coordinating
Committee and Joint Economic Committees. In July the
President vested in the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of the Treasury, the AttorIl:ey
General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator
of Export Control and the Coordinator of Commercial
and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, the authority to issue and maintain lists of names
of persons and firms who because of pro-Axis ties,
would be denied the right to trade with residents of the
United States. The Department of State established
a Division of World Trade Intelligence on 21 July, and
on 30 July an Executive Order created the Office of
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and established in it a Committee on Inter-American Affairs. On
the same day the President set up an Economic Defense
{ 28

J.

Board, which six months later became the Board of
Economic Warfare. In July 1943 this latter agency
was abolished. Its functions were transferred to the
Office of Economic Warfare, which two months later
was itself transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration.
The Office for Emergency Management acquired in
August 1941 a Supply Priorities and Allocations Board.
In October the Department of State set up a Board of
Economic Operations and a Division of Commercial
Policy and Agreements, which latter absorbed the
Division of Commercial Treaties and Agreements, created
in July 1940. As part of the same organization the
Department of State set up a Division of Exports and
Defense Aid, which was abolished in June, 1942; a
Division of Defense Materials, which was abolished in
August 1942; a Division of Studies and Statistics,
which was abolished in June 1942; and a Foreign Funds
and Financial Division, which was abolished in August
1943.
A special Caribbean Office came into being in October
1941.
In November 1941 the Canadian-American Joint
Defense Production Committee became the J oint War
Production Committee, United States and Canada. The
Department of State established a Financial Division
and Foreign Funds Control Division in November 1941.
In January 1942 the President abolished the Office
. of Production Management and transferred its powers
to the War Production Board. He and Prime Minister
Churchill set up a Combined Raw Materials Board, a
Munitions Assignments Board and a Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. The American section of this
ShipP!ng Board was to be in the Office for Emergency
Management as a War Shipping Administration.
In February 1942 the State Department created an
American Hemisphere Exports Office. In March the
Anglo-American Caribbean Commission came into existence. June saw the birth of a Combined Food Board
and a Combined Production and Resources Board. July
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marked the beginning of institutional interest in relief.
First, there was the War Relief Control Board and in
November the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations. In November also the Department of
State established an Office of Foreign Territories to have
"responsibility for dealing with all non-military matters
arising as a result of the military occupation of territories in Europe and North Africa by the armed forces
of the United Nations and affecting the interests of the
United States". Seven months later this was abolished.
In January 1943 the Division of Economic Studies
was established. In February 1943 the Department of
State set up a Division of Exports and Requirements
and abolished its American Hemisphere Exports Office.
In April the Treasury made public a provisional outline of a plan for post-war international monetary
stabilization (Post-War I nternational Monetary Stabilization Plan); in May the United Nations Conference
on Food and Agriculture met in Hot Springs. In the
same month there was a meeting of the M exicanUnited States Commission of Experts To Formulate a
Program for Economic Cooperation Between the Two
Governments, and the Office of War Mobilization was
set up. In June the President sent the Secretary of
State a Plan for Coordinating the Economic Activities
of United States Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas.
Also in June the Department of State set up an o.ffice
of Foreign Economic Coordination and abolished its
Office of Foreign Territories and its Board of Economic
Operations. In July an Executive Order created an
Office of Economic Warfare, to which was transferred
all powers and duties of the Board of Economic Warfare and all subsidiaries of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation engaged in financing foreign purchases
and imports. This Office lived only two months and
was transferred to the Foreign Economic A.dministration on 25 September. In August the War Commodities
Division and the Blockade and Supply Division came
into existence in the Office of Foreign Economic Coordi-
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nation of the Department of State, and the Foreign
Funds Control Division and the Division of Defense
Materials were abolished. As has been said, 25 September saw the creation of the Foreign Economic
A dministration ill the Office for Emergency Management.
It was to centralize the activities formerly carried on
by the Offices of Lend-Lease . Administration, Foreign
Relief an{l Rehabilitation Operations, Economic Warfare, and Foreign Economic Coordination. The Department of State on 6 November abolished its Office of
Foreign Economic Coordination and appointed four
groups of advisers to be "concerned, respectively, with
the foreign policy aspects of matters relating to the
allocation of supplies, of wartime economic activities
in liberated areas, of wartime economic activities in
eastern hemisphere countries other than liberated
areas, and of wartime economic activities in the other
American republics" . On 9 November came the
Signature of Agree·rnent for United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration.
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